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“Abortion Will Deprive You  
of Happiness!” 
Soviet Reproductive Politics in the Post-Stalin Era
Amy E. Randall
This article examines Soviet reproductive politics after the Communist 
regime legalized abortion in 1955. The regime’s new abortion policy did 
not result in an end to the condemnation of abortion in official discourse. 
The government instead launched an extensive campaign against abor-
tion. Why did authorities bother legalizing the procedure if they still 
disapproved of it so strongly? Using archival sources, public health 
materials, and medical as well as popular journals to investigate the 
antiabortion campaign, this article argues that the Soviet government 
sought to regulate gender and sexuality through medical intervention 
and health “education” rather than prohibition and force in the post-
Stalin era. It also explores how the antiabortion public health campaign 
produced “knowledge” not only about the procedure and its effects, but 
also about gender and sexuality, subjecting both women and men to new 
pressures and regulatory norms.
Figure 1. V. Stepanov, “Abort lishit vas schast’ia” (Abortion will deprive 
you of happiness), 1966. Courtesy of the Russian State Library.
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A forlorn-looking woman and man peer at an empty crib filled only with the words “Abortion will deprive you of happiness.”1 (Figure 1) 
This image surprisingly was not produced when abortion was outlawed 
in the Soviet Union but rather in 1966, many years after abortion was, for 
the second time, legalized. A product of the antiabortion campaign that 
accompanied the legalization of abortion in 1955, the poster illustrates two 
of the campaign’s main narratives: that abortion could destroy a woman’s 
reproductive capacity and that it could destroy family happiness. Viewed in 
historical context, the image reflects and reinforces broader efforts to exert 
“soft” control over the Soviet population in the post-Stalin era through 
reconfiguring gender roles and sexual norms.
Communist authorities first legalized abortion in 1920, only to change 
course during the Stalin era and recriminalize it in 1936 (except for very 
limited medical conditions). Whether abortion was criminalized or legalized, 
abortion policy in both the pre and postwar eras was justified in the same 
way: concern for women’s wellbeing.2 The 1955 policy shift was the culmi-
nation of growing concern in the late 1940s and early 1950s among Soviet 
officials and medical personnel about the high number of illegal abortions 
and their associated costs. The government initially resisted decriminalizing 
abortion, instead expanding antiabortion education, the medical policing 
of reproduction, and the range of medical conditions under which abor-
tion was authorized. But after Stalin died in 1953, new government reports 
reconfirmed the hazards of underground abortion, detailing approximately 
4,000 annual deaths as well as many other problems that impaired women’s 
procreative abilities. Anxiety about the illegal procedure’s negative effects 
on women’s health contributed to the decision to relegalize abortion.3
The change in abortion policy was also a product of broader pronatal-
ist angst about the nation’s “long-term rates of conception and birth” and 
the demographic consequences of dangerous illegal abortions.4 This is not 
surprising; Soviet abortion policy, in its various incarnations, was always 
accompanied by official pronatalism. Communist leaders consistently touted 
motherhood as a social duty and developed state policies and services to 
encourage women to reproduce.5 Soviet pronatalism was not unique; many 
governments throughout Europe adopted measures to increase birthrates, 
particularly in the interwar era and after World War Two.6 What was un-
usual in the Soviet case was the conjunction of state pronatalism with the 
legalization of abortion and promotion of contraception. In other European 
countries, official interest in boosting reproduction—intensified by wartime 
casualties—meant that abortion remained illegal and contraception was 
outlawed or limited. The Soviet Union faced a particularly devastating 
demographic crisis after World War Two: approximately twenty-six million 
soldiers and civilians had perished. These staggering wartime losses gave 
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impetus to pronatalist measures and propaganda.7 Interestingly, the very 
year that the government decriminalized abortion, Khrushchev trumpeted 
the great need to increase Soviet fertility, proclaiming: “The more people we 
have, the stronger our country will be.”8 But even if Khrushchev’s interest 
in boosting the birthrate might seem at odds with the regime’s decision 
to allow abortion and contraception, pronatalism explicitly informed this 
policy shift.9 Soviet officials and medical experts hoped that legalization 
would strengthen the nation’s reproductive health, since they believed the 
illegal termination of pregnancy adversely affected women’s long term 
ability to procreate to a greater extent than medicalized abortion. A similar 
logic contributed to the endorsement of contraceptives; authorities thought 
their use would result in fewer illegal and legal abortions, both of which 
were deemed detrimental to women’s fertility.
The government’s pronatalist agenda was reflected directly in the text 
of the 1955 decree. It paternalistically claimed that “measures carried out by 
the Soviet state to encourage motherhood and protect infancy, as well as the 
uninterrupted growth of the consciousness and culturedness (kul’turnost’) 
of women,” allowed for the change in abortion policy.10 Governmental aid 
for reproduction and women’s greater maturity, the decree implied, meant 
that most women would choose motherhood over abortion. In marked 
contrast to the 1920 decree, the 1955 decree recognized a woman’s right 
to control her reproduction. But it also made clear that authorities did not 
condone abortion and that preventing the procedure remained a key goal. 
Even without legal prohibition, the decree declared, abortions could be 
limited by increasing state resources for mothers and expanding education. 
The 1955 decree decriminalized abortion as long as it was conducted 
“in hospitals or other medical institutions.”11 As the historian Deborah Field 
notes, the 1955 abortion law thus “called for both greater individual free-
dom and increased intervention in women’s reproductive lives.”12 Indeed, 
whether the issue was abortion or birth control, the antiabortion campaign 
suggested that women not seek to control their fertility without consult-
ing medical authorities. Women were warned that some health conditions 
made abortion advisable, even if potentially hazardous, for pregnancy 
would be even riskier. Other conditions meant that even “if a woman did 
not want to keep a pregnancy,” abortion was simply too dangerous. Noting 
that preventative devices suitable for some women were unsuitable, even 
unsafe, for others, health pamphlets similarly cautioned women interested 
in contraception to seek medical advice.13 By framing pregnancy, abortion, 
and contraception as potential health hazards that required expert guid-
ance, the antiabortion campaign reinforced the regime’s ongoing efforts to 
medicalize reproduction. 
Journal of Women’s History16 Fall
The change in abortion policy was part of a broader reconfiguration of 
party-state control after Stalin’s death in 1953. Under Nikita Khrushchev’s 
leadership, the Soviet regime promoted a series of reforms, “de-Staliniza-
tion,” and a cultural “thaw.” Yet even as Khrushchev’s regime repudiated 
the violent coercion and punitive excesses of Stalinism, it still sought to dis-
cipline the everyday lives and practices of citizens. Thus the regime exhorted 
the populace to pursue the tenets of “Communist morality,” a longstanding 
objective that was reinvigorated and formalized as a twelve-point moral code 
at the 1961 Twenty-Second Communist Party Congress. This code “imposed 
both public and private obligations, demanding orderly personal conduct in 
addition to patriotism, diligence, and activism.” During this period, citizens 
were subjected to greater efforts to regulate personal behavior via the expan-
sion of mechanisms for mutual surveillance—such as people’s patrols—and 
greater official attention to and punishment of unseemly practices, including 
activities deemed sexually immoral or deviant.14 Soviet officials, profession-
als, and the media expressed increased interest in the domestic sphere and 
women’s societal roles, suggesting a new spirit of intrusiveness regarding 
these matters.15 The regime’s simultaneous legalization of abortion, and 
antiabortion campaign, are properly understood within this larger context. 
Using archival sources, public health materials, and medical as well as 
popular journals, this article examines Soviet reproductive politics from the 
mid-1950s to approximately 1970, focusing on the antiabortion campaign 
as a window on Communist techniques for governing in the post-Stalin 
era.16 It argues that the campaign served to reinforce official pronatalism 
in the wake of abortion’s legalization, and that it contributed to shifts in 
official Soviet discourse about the family, sexual norms, and gender roles, 
including constructions of masculinity. As the article shows, a tension 
between relatively emancipatory and traditionalist impulses marked not 
only abortion policy but the broader Soviet approach to gender, sexuality, 
and society during this time. Reproductive politics epitomized this tension. 
Reproductive Health, Motherhood, and Happiness 
As abortion was reframed as a medical matter rather than as a crimi-
nal affair, the imperative to regulate reproductive behavior via persuasion 
acquired new saliency. Pursuing the 1955 decree’s directive to increase 
educational efforts to combat abortion, public health officials and activists 
as well as medical personnel were largely responsible for the discursive 
explosion that followed.17 Reaffirming the regime’s pronatalism, they 
characterized abortion as a “serious evil,” which could damage a woman’s 
health, deprive her “of the happiness of motherhood” and negatively affect 
“family relations.”18
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As educators conducted the antiabortion campaign, they drew upon 
strategies that had begun to be more actively promoted in the early 1950s 
as concerns about illegal abortion grew: spreading awareness about the 
procedure via lectures, popular-scientific literature, posters, and the press.19 
Compared to this earlier agitation, the campaign of the late 1950s and 
1960s was more expansive, targeting a larger audience. A “huge army of 
obstetricians and gynecologists” engaged in the “struggle against abortion” 
at maternity homes, ob-gyn departments at hospitals, nursing-midwife 
“points,” and women’s consultation clinics, where women received gyne-
cological and obstetric care. Medical personnel talked about abortion with 
the general female public—not just with patients for whom pregnancy was 
risky or who had just terminated their pregnancies (the primary emphasis 
of earlier educational efforts). With the motto that “It is better to prevent 
pregnancy than to terminate one,” personnel sought to increase awareness 
about birth control.20 In 1959 alone, women’s clinics and similar facilities in 
the Samarkand Oblast organized 555 lectures and 7,570 talks about abortion 
and contraception.21 Antiabortion posters and pamphlets, photo exhibits, 
wall newspapers, and “boards of questions and answers” provided patients 
with additional information. One year, for example, women’s clinics in 
Bashkir ASSR organized ninety-one photo exhibits on “What is necessary 
to know about the dangers of abortion.” Although efforts to encourage birth 
control were stymied by widespread contraceptive shortages, educators 
nonetheless publicized a variety of devices, including condoms, cervical 
caps, rubber diaphragms, spermicidal creams, and vaginal sponges or 
wadded tampons doused in vinegar, boric acid, or dairy acid, and some 
women’s facilities even sold them.22 
The antiabortion campaign was an all-union affair—conducted in Rus-
sian as well as Tatar, Uzbek, and other non-Russian languages throughout 
the Soviet Union. Regional and cultural differences informed the campaign. 
Thus, for example, medical personnel and public health officials in Uz-
bekistan emphasized the particular dangers of abortion for female minors, 
because underage marriage remained a problem in Central Asia, notwith-
standing its illegality.23 Despite some differences, however, the campaign’s 
basic contours appear to have been the same: to promulgate the dangers 
of abortion, even medicalized abortion, among the broader Soviet popu-
lace, and to spread pronatalist propaganda. As a result, educational efforts 
targeted not only women’s medical facilities but also industrial enterprises 
as well as non-workplace settings, such as workers’ dormitories and clubs, 
secondary and post-secondary schools, and various public venues.24 In 1956, 
for example, medical workers organized over 20,000 antiabortion lectures 
and talks throughout Tashkent.25 Public health activists from “sanitary en-
lightenment houses” arranged screenings of antiabortion films, including 
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“This doesn’t happen without consequences,” first released in 1950, and 
at least eight other films produced between 1956 and 1967.26 Lectures and 
literature on a “girl’s hygiene,” the “hygiene of youth,” and the “hygiene of 
marriage,” including those sponsored by “universities of health for women” 
and “for youth,” also publicized the perils of terminating a pregnancy.27 So 
too did the radio and printed press—particularly Zdorov’e, a health journal 
with a circulation of millions in the mid-1960s, and women’s journals such 
as Sovetskaia zhenshchina and Rabotnitsa.28 
Although medicalized abortion was certainly not without its dangers 
in the 1950s and 1960s, the government’s education strategy was not non-
partisan: the point was to discourage abortion by highlighting its risks and 
costs, even in misleading ways, and to teach the Soviet populace to “be afraid 
of abortion.”29 Thus antiabortion rhetoric characterized women as victims 
who had “to survive the severity of abortion” and its “frequent” adverse 
effects.30 The campaign made use of the most well-known victim of illegal 
abortion, the character Natalia from Mikhail Sholokhov’s interwar novel, 
Quiet Flows the Don, which remained very popular in the post-Stalin era 
and was made into an award-winning three-part epic film in the late 1950s. 
Relying on the novel and film’s cultural currency, public health literature 
referred to Natalia’s death to highlight the genuine peril of underground 
abortion, which women continued to resort to for personal as well as other 
reasons, despite the change in Soviet abortion policy.31 Instructional mate-
rials for the antiabortion campaign recommended reading audiences an 
excerpt from the novel, because it had a “significant emotional impact on 
women listeners.”32 Some educators clearly heeded this advice. In lectur-
ing to women workers, for example, one doctor narrated the consequences 
of Natalia’s botched abortion: “How terribly Natalia had changed in one 
night! Only the day before she had been like a young apple tree in blos-
som—beautiful, healthy, strong, but now her cheeks looked whiter than 
the chalk of the Donside hills, her nose had narrowed, her lips had lost 
their former clear freshness . . .” To accentuate the tragedy of the situation, 
the doctor reminded listeners that Natalia was already the mother of two 
children, and described her ultimate demise.33 
Although health professionals and educators acknowledged that 
medicalized abortion was safer than underground abortion, they still de-
scribed it as dangerous or “extremely dangerous.”34 Underscoring the “great 
trauma” that abortion caused to the positive and “complex restructuring 
of the organism” that commenced with pregnancy, they characterized it 
as an invasive operation.35 Antiabortion campaigners also claimed that 
medicalized abortion rarely “proceeded without consequences.”36 Seeking 
to challenge popular misconceptions that abortion was a “simple” opera-
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tion, they underscored how the procedure required doctors to carry out 
“fairly complicated manipulations” without being able to see what they 
were doing.37 Moreover, they argued, abortion heightened women’s risk of 
infection. Even medical personnel who carefully followed sanitary rules did 
not always succeed in eliminating microbes that could endanger a woman’s 
health, a particular problem given that the uterus and cervix’s “wounded 
surfaces” made them more susceptible to contagion.38 Abortion-related 
infection often led to subsequent problems that were not always imme-
diately obvious—for example, inflammation of the internal genitalia and 
infertility—leading women to believe, wrongly, that termination produced 
no long term consequences. Women aborting first pregnancies reportedly 
were most likely to suffer from such difficulties.39 “The termination of a first 
pregnancy,” medical expert Nikonchik opined, “often cripples a woman’s 
life and deprives her forever of the ability to become a mother.”40 A health 
pamphlet declared: “How many blossoming young healthy women have 
become infertile as a result of this first abortion, becoming permanent pa-
tients of women’s clinics, dreaming about pregnancy and motherhood!”41
By underscoring abortions’ health risks, educators hoped to deter 
women from pursuing them. But if the threat of medical complications and 
reproductive problems did not serve as a deterrent, antiabortion discourse 
offered additional reasons to avoid the procedure: the risk to sexual feel-
ing and the threat of premature aging. “After an abortion,” publications 
cautioned, “sexual desire in a woman often decreases and sometimes com-
pletely disappears.” Public health materials also claimed that women who 
terminated pregnancies aged more quickly than those who “fulfilled their 
natural destiny: birthing children.” Signs of this premature aging included 
the early graying of hair, the emergence of wrinkles, the loss of “turgor and 
elasticity” in the skin, and perimenopausal symptoms.42 
In accentuating abortions’ hazards, some of the campaign’s “scare 
tactics” were worse than others. Particularly egregious was one pamphlet, 
About the Danger of Abortion, which explained: “. . . regardless of its outcome 
. . .  abortion is a drama, and not infrequently a serious tragedy, particularly 
for young women in the prime of life and health,” who become “victims 
of abortion, ruining their health in some cases for many years and at other 
times forever, becoming invalids or even paying with their life.”43 Such 
alarmist rhetoric differed dramatically from the far more benign depiction 
of medicalized abortion presented in five international studies from the 
mid-1950s to the mid-1960s. These studies indicated that the procedure 
caused few serious complications such as inflammatory disease or infertility. 
Soviet medical reports on the procedure’s adverse effects were meanwhile 
inconsistent, suggesting at times that it caused infertility in 2.6 percent of 
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women and at other times that it caused infertility in 35 percent of women. 
Nonetheless, the antiabortion campaign painted a uniformly grim picture, 
emphasizing the possibility of dire consequences.44 Not unlike public health 
education about venereal disease, which exaggerated or lied about its dan-
gers “to terrorize young people into toeing the official line,” the antiabortion 
campaign evoked people’s fears in an effort to control them.45 
With a demonstrable natalist agenda, the campaign also reminded the 
Soviet people that motherhood was a “government necessity.”46 This was not 
a new idea; the Communist government had long conceived of motherhood 
as a civic responsibility.47 Writings and lectures about abortion underscored 
the obligation of women as Soviet citizens to become mothers and raise 
“healthy, cheerful children who [were] not afraid of difficulties” and who 
were “worthy of this wonderful epoch in which we live.”48 Articles pointed 
out how the birth of a child was good for society, and how new generations 
labored “on behalf of the further strengthening and flourishing of [the] 
motherland.”49 By characterizing reproduction as a national priority and 
societal obligation, antiabortion materials implicitly characterized abortion 
as contrary to national interests and women’s civic duties.50
The campaign depended upon a naturalized definition of motherhood. 
It claimed that all Soviet women aimed to become mothers, that motherhood 
was an “instinct of every woman,” and that there was “no greater happi-
ness for women than the happiness of motherhood.”51 Texts additionally 
asserted, “Motherly feeling is an inexhaustible source of energy, which 
makes a woman’s life complete and happy.”52 According to this pronatalist 
rhetoric, choosing motherhood was natural whereas choosing abortion was 
unnatural. Highlighting this message, one health poster featured a mother 
gazing lovingly at her infant with the text: “And I wanted to have an abortion 
. . .” Fortunately for this mother and baby, the poster suggested, the right 
decision had been made, and happiness and health had been preserved.53 
Educational materials often included “letters” from or stories about happy 
mothers who had almost terminated but then continued their pregnancies, 
similarly emphasizing the rightness of choosing motherhood over abortion.54 
Antiabortion discourse proposed that women’s yearning for mother-
hood, and the joy they derived from being mothers, were the main reasons 
why abortion, and the subsequent infertility supposedly caused by it, could 
be so devastating. Even if women had fulfilling marital relationships as well 
as “interesting and wonderful work,” their barrenness and desire for a child 
would give rise to a sense of dissatisfaction and a “less than complete life.”55 
“Stop!,” one poster warned, “Now abortion seems necessary, but remember, 
it might forever deprive you of the happiness of motherhood!” Featuring 
a woman’s shapely leg in pink hosiery and a fashionable high-heeled shoe 
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stepping on the stem of a blue flower, this poster marked the leg as that of 
a presumably young woman taking a careless and destructive step. Young 
women, the image conveyed, should not take the decision of abortion lightly 
and destroy what is beautiful and natural: motherhood, symbolized by the 
flower. Drawing attention to the emptiness that a childless woman would 
supposedly feel, another poster depicted a sad looking matreshka (wooden 
nesting doll) opened up without anything inside and cautioned: “Abortion 
threatens infertility.”56 By pursuing abortion, a health pamphlet similarly 
proposed, a woman could “not be confident about the possibility of becom-
ing a mother in the future.”57
Why did I do that?, a public health film released in 1956, emphasized 
how ending pregnancy could lead to such a catastrophic outcome. This 
widely-shown film featured two women: vibrant Lena, who is planning 
an abortion until confronted by Katya, who shares her terrible story about 
the procedure’s pernicious effects. As Katya’s tale unfolds, viewers learn of 
Katya’s romance with Victor, their marriage, and Katya’s pregnancy. Victor 
responds to the news of pregnancy with fear, anxiety, and then resignation 
“that it wouldn’t be so bad to become a father,” dampening Katya’s initial 
enthusiasm. Seeking advice, the couple turns to Victor’s mother, who reacts 
with bleak words: “There will be diapers, sleepless nights . . .” In the end, 
Katya obtains an abortion. At first there are no noticeable repercussions. 
But then the film reveals that the procedure has greatly impaired Katya’s 
reproductive ability. The movie ends with a second meeting between Lena 
and Katya. Here it becomes apparent that Lena, despite her earlier intentions, 
ultimately decided against abortion. Lena is presented as a happy mother, 
who, unlike the unfortunate Katya, has avoided a “horrible mistake.” Katya, 
meanwhile, still suffers from her abortion’s consequences, and it is not clear 
if she will ever be able to bear a child.58 This movie impressed upon viewers 
the necessity of choosing motherhood over abortion for protecting future 
health and happiness. 
Abortion-related infertility reportedly undermined not only personal 
happiness but also “family” happiness—that is, the happiness of women 
and men, wives and husbands. Antiabortion images emphasized this ef-
fect by including men as victims of such infertility and suggesting that as 
potential fathers, they too suffered. One poster, for example, represented a 
woman and man as two birds looking down at an empty nest with tears in 
their eyes, accompanied by the message: “Abortion can lead to irreparable 
misfortune.” Conveying the same basic message, but highlighting the joy 
of parenting instead of lost opportunity, another poster featured a mother’s 
and father’s faces smiling at a happy baby and declared: “Don’t be deprived 
of happiness!”59 
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In addition to such illustrations, which underscored how abortion 
could destroy family happiness, health literature repeatedly asserted that 
abortion-related sterility and the subsequent lack of children in a family “can 
lead to family conflict and not infrequently serves as a reason for divorce.”60 
What Every Woman Should Know recounted the story of a woman whose mar-
riage and happiness were in jeopardy because of an abortion from her mid-
twenties, which had resulted in inflammatory disease, a lengthy hospital 
stay, and numerous other problems, including pelvic pain and loss of sexual 
feeling. After years of trying to get pregnant, this woman was desperate to 
become a mother at the age of thirty-five. As she explained to her doctor, 
her husband was threatening divorce because of her inability to conceive.61 
Emphasizing the likelihood of marital discord because of abortion-related 
sterility, antiabortion propaganda frequently referred to supposedly true 
narratives of husbands abandoning their newly infertile wives.62 
Tales of abandonment and the destruction of marriage were meant to 
impress upon women the double tragedy of abortion: it could leave them 
without children and without husbands. The idea that abortion-related in-
fertility would lead to a life of loneliness, a life without a family or marriage, 
was vividly conveyed. One poster showcased the silhouette of a woman 
perched on a huge rock, with her back hunched forward, elbows on knees, 
and head bent forward, a position suggesting despair. The woman’s slim 
figure, attractive legs, high heels, and hair style suggested her youthfulness 
(and unmarried status). The poster offered two signs of the woman’s steril-
ity: the background of barren trees and the huge rock. According to popular 
folklore, sitting on a hard or cold surface could destroy a woman’s reproduc-
tive organs. This image of despair and infertility was accompanied by the 
words: “Abortion has dangerous consequences. Don’t condemn yourself to 
solitude!”63 (See figure 2.) Echoing this sentiment, a health pamphlet argued 
that “if young women could imagine fully the difficulty of solitude in old 
age,” they would avoid abortion, which leads to such “sad consequences.”64 
Yet another poster asserted the connection between abortions’ hazards and 
a life without a family more emphatically. “Infertility and bitter loneliness,” 
the text declared, “are common consequences of abortion.” On the poster’s 
left side was a young boy’s smiling face. The right side featured a lone 
woman with brow furrowed and mouth downturned, clutching a shawl 
tightly around her shoulders. The woman’s expression and shawl signaled 
that she was very unhappy and probably middle-aged, suggesting she had 
been “alone” for some time. Unlike the boy’s face, which was surrounded 
by light, the image of the woman was cloaked in darkness, underscoring 
her misery and solitude. A potted plant instead of a family kept this tragic 
woman company, fulfilling the prophecy quoted above.65 (See figure 3.)
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Figure 2. A. Rudkovich, “Abort opasen posledstviiami! Ne 
obrekaite sebia na odinochestvo!” (Abortion has dangerous con-
sequences. Don’t condemn yourself to solitude!), 1965. Courtesy 
of the Russian State Library.
Figure 3. A. Kazhdan, “Besplodie, gor’koe odinochestvo – 
obychnye posledstviia aborta” (Infertility and bitter loneliness 
are common consequences of abortion), 1966. Courtesy of the 
Russian State Library.
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By focusing on marital problems and spinsterhood as possible conse-
quences of abortion, the campaign reaffirmed a normative nuclear model of 
the Soviet family: one with a mother and father. This familial image marked 
a shift in emphasis from the iconography of the Soviet family in the imme-
diate postwar era, in which “single-mother” families figured prominently. 
During this time, women’s journals depicted single motherhood as not only 
acceptable but even desirable in certain situations.66 These journals and 
the press more generally displayed ideal Soviet women as “single women 
with children and full and happy lives.” Articles celebrated single mothers, 
detailing how they managed with government assistance to raise children 
and pursue full-time work without a spouse.67 Genre painting portrayed 
women as successful heads of households with thriving children but no 
husbands.68 Although the two-parent nuclear family remained central in 
official Soviet discourse, single-mother families were legitimized and images 
of the “lone mother” and “fatherless children” abounded.69 
To some extent, this representation of the “single-mother” family was 
rooted in reality: after the wartime death of millions of men, many widowed 
mothers raised families alone. But this representation was also reflective of 
the Communist regime’s interest in increasing the country’s birthrate, an 
interest reinvigorated by wartime losses. Women’s necessary single parent-
hood and the regime’s natalist agenda led to a new Family Law in 1944 that 
legitimized “single motherhood as [a] site of reproduction” by sanctioning, 
indeed rewarding, “illegitimate” births. This law forbade unmarried women 
from claiming child support from the fathers of their “out-of-wedlock” 
children or from naming the fathers on their children’s birth certificates. 
Instead of paternal support, the government promised financial aid to 
single mothers, reinforcing women’s relationship with the state (and not 
with their male partners). By relieving men of familial responsibility, the 
law encouraged men, “both single and married, to impregnate millions of 
women, many of whom became the ‘new single mothers’ of the postwar 
era.” In the late 1940s and early 1950s, “single-mother” families became an 
increasing reality. Whereas 280,000 unmarried mothers received government 
aid in 1945, by 1957 3.2 million did.70
Husbands and Fathers in the Service of the State
The antiabortion campaign’s emphasis on the two-parent family en-
tailed a reconceptualization of men’s familial roles. The campaign recon-
structed men as “responsible” Soviet citizens who had domestic duties, 
serving to promote a new image of husbands and fathers in the post-Stalin 
era. This family vision assigned men a central role, standing in stark contrast 
to representations of the Soviet family in the immediate postwar period, 
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in which men were frequently eliminated or marginalized. In postwar im-
agery, husband-fathers were typically absent, as if nonessential, in articles 
featuring married working mothers. The Soviet press did not usually depict 
men as supportive spouses or active caregivers.71 Moreover, family men 
were often portrayed negatively—as drunkards or as “wounded souls” 
with mutilated bodies, veteran-husbands whose loving wives took care of 
them.72 Meanwhile, as poems, articles, and other materials celebrated the 
robust and wise “father” Stalin and his accomplishments, Stalin served as 
the symbolic father for a Soviet populace ravaged by the Second World War.73 
This postwar marginalization of men in the domestic sphere followed 
decades of earlier marginalization. As scholars have pointed out, during the 
1920s the domestic power of husbands and fathers was curtailed because 
of the adoption of new family laws, divorce procedures, and the medical-
ization of motherhood.74 By politicizing motherhood and characterizing 
it as a “noble and rewarded service to the state,” Communist authorities 
meanwhile diminished fathers’ position in the family and served to exclude 
them from the “state-mother-child triad.”75 Husbands’ command over wives 
was further reduced during the drive for rapid industrialization as women 
entered wage labor en masse and secured greater economic independence. 
The wife-activists movement of the 1930s, which granted wives a major role 
in the campaign for kul’turnost’ (culturedness), including the disciplining 
of men, also lessened men’s domestic authority.76 Even though the govern-
ment endorsed the nuclear family in the interwar era, and indeed sought to 
strengthen it in the mid 1930s when it enacted new legislation which made 
divorce more difficult, outlawed abortion, and reconfirmed fathers’ duty 
to provide child support, authorities did not promote men’s supremacy 
in the domestic sphere as husbands or fathers. As the social psychologist 
Sergei Kukhterin notes, the “[s]tate did not give institutional support to 
male dominance in the family, rather it supported the cause of women as 
a force for order on the home front.”77 Even if patriarchal gender relations 
in the domestic sphere still prevailed and men continued to wield power, 
authorities moreover encouraged men to realize themselves at work or in 
the battlefield, not in the family. Not surprisingly, given the persistence of 
Soviet pronatalism and wartime exigencies, despite men’s marginalization 
in the domestic sphere Communist leaders did not exclude them from the 
responsibility to procreate. A 1941 decree that taxed the “childless,” includ-
ing men, and extended the system of “categorizing citizens by reproductive 
contribution to the state,” a system that had previously focused on women’s 
contributions, reinforced this male obligation.78 Yet although the govern-
ment expected men to procreate, the new Family Law of 1944 clarified that 
men were not required to marry the women they had sexual relationships 
with or support the offspring of their liaisons. As these examples suggest, 
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from the 1920s to the Stalin era, the Soviet regime largely emphasized men’s 
procreative role, not their fatherly or husbandly role, and masculinity was 
defined primarily by what men did in the public sphere.
The antiabortion campaign of the late 1950s and 1960s helped to domes-
ticate Soviet masculinity by reconfiguring men’s roles in the reproductive 
sphere and the family. The campaign promoted abortion as a husbandly 
concern and fatherly matter. One way it did so was by emphasizing how 
abortion threatened family happiness, including the husband’s: if a wife 
became infertile after having an abortion, the husband would eventually 
leave the wife so he could become a father, or he would remain in the mar-
riage, unhappy because of his inability to realize fatherhood. Embedded in 
this narrative was the assumption that fatherhood, like motherhood, was 
natural. Sometimes this assumption was made explicit: “The instinct of 
motherhood and fatherhood is a part of the very nature of human beings. 
The lack of children gives rise to difficult feelings in the wife as well as the 
husband, involving an unsatisfactory life, and often leads to the severance 
of family relations.”79 In contrast to the immediate postwar era, when the 
Soviet regime encouraged men to impregnate women but not necessarily 
assume any familial responsibilities, this rhetoric suggested that marriage 
and fatherhood were critical to a man’s identity.
Men were included not only in antiabortion discourse but also in the 
campaign’s broader educational work. Thus many doctors and other health 
educators targeted men in public lectures and talks.80 Medical personnel, 
for example, organized antiabortion lectures for men in Sevastopol in 1961. 
In the first half of 1966, women’s consultation clinics arranged similar talks 
for male workers at several large industrial enterprises in Tashkent.81 This 
agitation was considered necessary because it was “well known that many 
men don’t take very seriously the abortions carried out by their wives.”82 
In addition, “Men [were] not completely competent about the hygiene of 
sexual life.” As one health educator explained, “They usually receive medi-
cal information about abortion from their wives, whom they don’t always 
believe, because they think that their wives exaggerate everything with the 
goal of frightening them.”83 Such ignorance was problematic because of 
men’s perceived influence on women’s reproductive decisions. A husband 
often knew early on about his wife’s pregnancy and “by his reaction to it, 
passively or actively impelled a woman to terminate the pregnancy.”84 Men’s 
ignorance, plus “egotistical reasons,” led them to conclude that abortion 
was “the best way out of a situation.”85 Ideally, if men were taught about 
the potential risks involved, they would not pressure women to have abor-
tions and they might even become more proactive partners. When medical 
personnel in Rostov on the Don refused to perform abortions for women 
pregnant for the first time until after they had met with the women’s hus-
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bands, their meetings reportedly yielded some success; about 10 percent 
of the wives subsequently refrained from the procedure.86 According to an 
instructional pamphlet for medical personnel, it was imperative to conduct 
antiabortion propaganda among men that emphasized “their responsibility 
for a wife’s health and family happiness.”87
Outreach to the male population included many visual and textual 
materials which were explicitly designed to speak to men and women. 
One brochure noted that while women would probably constitute its main 
audience, it was possible that the reader would be a man “concerned about 
his future fatherhood.”88 After first addressing female readers, another 
pamphlet turned to male readers “who sometimes, unfortunately, do not 
want to know abortion and its dangerous consequences.” The pamphlet 
asserted: “We intend this brochure to be not only for women but also men.” 
Why? Because “it was not a secret that quite often a woman decides to have 
an abortion not on her own, but under the influence or even pressure of a 
husband.” Before a husband pushed his wife “to have an abortion or gave 
in to her regarding this,” the text advised, he should “seriously think about 
the harmfulness and perils of abortion.”89
The antiabortion campaign’s focus on men represented an attempt 
to advance new social expectations about their domestic duties. Health 
materials not only included men as readers (at least some of the time), they 
also assigned them greater responsibility for reproductive decision-making 
than earlier antiabortion materials—which often ignored men’s influence 
on women’s decision to terminate, and, in some cases, even attributed 
influence to “the reaction” and “behavior” of nearby women friends and 
relatives.90 In addition to blaming men for abortions, these later antiabor-
tion texts frequently admonished men to help reduce them. One pamphlet 
explained: “The theme of abortion is incorrectly considered a woman’s.” 
Yet it argued that husbands needed to be concerned with the issue. After 
all, “[i]f a husband insisted on the birth of a child, it was a rare wife who 
decided to go against his wishes and have an abortion.” Even though many 
men tried to avoid “the question of preserving or terminating a pregnancy, 
and [did] not express their opinion, hoping to leave the decision” to their 
wives, “[t]his behavior of a husband is completely incorrect.” It was both 
the wife’s and the husband’s “responsibility” to decide whether “to birth a 
child or not, preserve the health of a woman or risk it, strengthen the fam-
ily or take a step towards its possible destruction.”91 In calling upon men 
to act as a “positive” force in reproductive decision-making, antiabortion 
rhetoric advanced the idea that men needed to defend their wives, future 
children, and the institution of marriage. 
This 1962 poster underscores the ways in which the campaign re-
envisioned men’s roles. The poster makes clear that abortion is a man’s 
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concern with the text, “For you comrade men,” in the largest letters. It 
then explains: “Don’t be surprised, comrade men, that we have decided 
to talk with you about such an intimate topic as abortion. Of course, first 
and foremost this problem concerns women, but you should also know 
why abortion is harmful. Wouldn’t you try to find the most convincing 
words to keep your beloved woman, your true friend, from this hasty step? 
Would you really remain indifferent to that which might deprive her of 
the happiness of motherhood?”92 In another section of the poster entitled, 
“Abortion doesn’t happen without consequences (a conversation of two 
women),” men are depicted as integral to reproductive decision-making. 
The first woman discusses how she and her husband long for another child. 
The problem is that earlier they opted for an abortion, which damaged 
her fallopian tubes and made it unlikely she would ever become a mother 
again. The second woman explains that she really wants a daughter but 
is considering an abortion because she doesn’t have a big apartment and 
her husband wants to wait to have children. The first woman responds by 
arguing that living in a better apartment without the “voice” and “laugh-
ter” of a child will be “depressing.” She urges the second woman and her 
husband to think seriously about this before it is too late, hinting at the 
possibility of abortion-related infertility. This “conversation” casts men as 
both wrongheaded proponents and victims of abortion. The voice of author-
ity in the poster, “a doctor,” similarly reproaches husbands for sometimes 
exercising a negative influence on women and pressuring them to get an 
abortion: “a frequent cause of infertility.” The doctor then underscores the 
absurdity and error of men’s actions by invoking the idea that the yearning 
for fatherhood is instinctual. “There will come a time when an ardent desire 
arises in the husband for his wife to bear a child. You see, in every man 
there is the longing for fatherhood.” By naturalizing fatherhood, this poster 
promoted it as an essential component of Soviet masculinity. The “doctor” 
also chastised men who sought to avoid the question of abortion, hoping to 
leave “the right” to decide to their wives. Such behavior was never correct. 
After all, “who, if not the husband, the father of the future child, should 
protect the health and life of a wife, the happiness of the family?” The im-
age of the woman and man in the bottom right of the poster serves as an 
additional rebuke to apathetic men. In between a sad-looking woman and 
an indifferent-looking man are the words: “Citizeness G. S. Pukhova goes 
to terminate her pregnancy (for her own reasons).” The message? If only 
the man has cared enough to intervene . . .  A poem about abortion by the 
famous Soviet poet, Margarita Aliger (on the left side), laments the loss of a 
“little boy” due to a man’s negative reaction to a woman’s pregnancy. Had 
the man supported the pregnancy, the poem suggests, the woman would 
have taken a different path. As this poster demonstrates, by appealing to 
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husbands to shield their pregnant wives and potential children from harm 
and assume more authority in the household, the antiabortion campaign 
promoted patriarchal gender norms: men were encouraged to assert their 
manhood by acting as responsible and protective husbands and fathers. 
(See figure 4.)
The reconceptualization of masculine identity advanced by the an-
tiabortion campaign was part of a larger discursive shift in constructions 
of Soviet masculinity. If in earlier Soviet times, as well as the Stalin Era, a 
man’s identity was tied predominantly to his actions and sacrifices in labor 
and the public sphere, and to his ability to become an exemplary “son,” 
by the late 1950s and 1960s official discourse began to ascribe greater sig-
nificance to his activities in the domestic sphere. Public health efforts that 
extended beyond the topic of abortion reinforced men’s roles as husbands 
and fathers. New initiatives were launched to instruct men to defend the 
health of women.93 At the Cheliabinsk metallurgical factory, for example, 
educators arranged weekly evening classes for husbands of pregnant 
women on the topic of “Guard the health of your wife” and “How to greet 
the newborn,” with a reported audience of 1,271 men.94 When pedagogues 
and others urged parents to instill the newly codified “Communist moral-
ity” in children, they assigned fathers a more active familial role. Although 
fatherhood continued to be defined in terms of “negative behaviors” such as 
drunkenness that “fathers should avoid,” it was also defined more positively, 
in terms of concrete responsibilities that a father should undertake. Peda-
gogical literature and “minors’ commissions” (volunteer groups formed 
to work with difficult children) instructed fathers to provide children with 
“intellectual stimulation and cultural enlightenment”—by taking them to 
theaters, movies, and museums.95 If before the Second World War and in 
the 1940s it was unusual for men to be censured or expelled by the Party 
merely for their husbandly and fatherly conduct, during the Khrushchev 
era, the Party placed greater emphasis on men’s family behavior and disci-
plined members “who abandoned their children, beat their wives, created 
an unhealthy family environment through constant squabbling, or broke 
up another citizen’s marriage.”96 After the death of Stalin—the patriarch 
of the Great Soviet Family—real “flesh and blood fathers” reappeared on 
the screen, “along with a refreshingly new awareness of their anxieties and 
internal contradictions.”97 During this time new attention was also paid to 
the father-figure in sports propaganda.98
Although in the post-Stalin era the Communist regime never relin-
quished its patriarchal authority over citizens, and official discourse still 
encouraged men to realize their manhood in the public sphere, changes 
in conceptualizations of Soviet masculinity were nonetheless afoot. The 
antiabortion campaign facilitated this transformation of manhood because 
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it promoted a different vision of the Soviet family—one that moved away 
from men’s marginalization as husbands and fathers and instead urged men 
to perform their masculinity by serving as more explicit heads and masters 
of their families. Official discourse significantly shied away from encourag-
ing husband-fathers to dominate their wives or assume complete control 
over the domestic sphere. Men were instead expected to assist women in 
their capacities as worker-mothers, protect their health, and promote the 
interests of the family, which would naturally coincide with the Communist 
regime’s interests. 
Conclusion
The 1955 legalization of abortion made it easier for Soviet women to 
regulate their fertility. The state’s simultaneous endorsement of contracep-
tion sanctioned women’s greater control over their bodies. No doubt many 
women perceived these changes as empowering. But as the antiabortion 
campaign unfolded, health officials and medical professionals subjected 
women to intense pressure and “education” to reject abortion, a coercive 
form of persuasion that undermined women’s reproductive autonomy. 
Poor access to contraception and the abysmal conditions under which legal 
Figure 4. L. Aristov, “K vam, tovarishchi muzhchiny” (For you, comrade men), 1962. 
Courtesy of the Russian State Library.
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abortions were provided, including assembly-line fashion and without 
anesthetic, likewise undercut the empowerment of women.99 Because the 
government failed to ensure an adequate supply of contraceptives, abortions 
indeed remained a de facto method of birth control. By enjoining men to 
intervene in reproductive matters, the antiabortion campaign also weakened 
women’s authority over their bodies and the family, at least rhetorically, and 
increased the social costs of remaining unmarried. In this broader context, 
women’s ability to choose or reject pregnancy was legally enhanced but 
nonetheless still limited in the post-Stalin era.
The antiabortion campaign contributed to the reconstruction of Soviet 
masculinity by assigning men a larger role in safeguarding reproduction and 
their families. This was part of a broader process: with the death of Stalin, 
the “universal father,” official discourse began to ascribe greater authority 
to men in the domestic sphere. Discursively, however, men’s power was 
constrained because the Soviet regime did not champion men’s dominance 
over women and because the government retained its role as supreme pa-
triarchal authority. The flip side of authority, moreover, was responsibility. 
Men were expected to alter their behavior and become more conscientious 
husbands and fathers. Assigning men greater domestic accountability was 
probably welcomed by many people, especially women, who criticized 
the 1944 Family Law for encouraging immoral male sexual behavior and 
increasing the number of “lone mothers” and “fatherless children” who 
suffered “social, moral, and economic problems” because of their status.100 
Shifts in expectations about men’s family roles during this period interest-
ingly presaged a broader focus in the 1970s on Soviet masculinity and men’s 
alleged degeneration.101
Soviet technologies of power underwent an important modification in 
the post-Stalin era. As authorities resorted less frequently to overt violence, 
prohibition, and punishment as methods for governing, the exercise of con-
trol via “normalizing” techniques—an already existing strategy—became 
even more important. Soviet reproductive politics exemplifies this shift. 
Although no longer banned, abortion was medicalized, which shifted the 
locus of the state’s control of sexuality from legal punitive institutions to 
medical, educational, and social institutions and increased the professional 
regulation of women’s bodies. The antiabortion public health campaign 
moreover produced “knowledge” not only about the procedure and its 
effects but also about gender and sexuality, which subjected both women 
and men to new pressures and regulatory norms. As the campaign sounded 
the alarm about infertile spinsters and their sad lives of solitude, and di-
rected men to assume a greater role in reproductive decision-making and 
the family, health educators and medical personnel promoted the regime’s 
pronatalist agenda, reaffirmed the importance of the two-parent family, 
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and advanced a more familiarized and “responsible” heterosexuality that 
supposedly served the interests of individuals as well as the state. The 
campaign ultimately helped to spread a more diffuse system of coercive 
techniques for disciplining citizenly behavior.
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